








The copyright of this thesis rests with the University of Cape Town. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published 
without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used 













“The tax deductibility of penalties levied in 
terms of the Competitions Act 89 of 1998 
and related expenditure,  
















Prepared by:   Emma Stansfield 
    (STNEMM001) 
 
Supervisor:   Trevor Emslie SC 
 
In fulfillment of the requirements of: CML6015W 
 
Research dissertation presented for the approval of Senate in fulfilment of part of the 
requirements for the Postgraduate Diploma in Tax Law in approved courses and a minor 
dissertation.  The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the completion 
of a programme of courses. 
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of Post Graduate Diploma in Tax Law dissertations, including those relating 
to length and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this 
dissertation conforms to those regulations. 
 
 













CONTENTS   
           Page 
       
Introduction and overview       2 
Part A: Are Competition Penalties Deductible?    5 
  1. General deduction formula s11(a) and related case law 5 
  2. Public Policy        12 
  3. The prohibition section 23(o)     15 
  4. Conclusion for the deductibility of competition penalties 19 
Part B: Deductibility of related legal fees     20 
  1. Introduction       20 
  2. Section 11(c) deduction and related case law   21 
  3. Conclusion for the deductibility of related legal fees  25 
Part C: Deductibility of related interest expense    27 
  1. Introduction        27 
  2. Relevant sections of the Act      28 
  3. General vs. specific borrowing      31 
  4. Purpose of borrowing       33 
  5. Public policy       38 
  6. Conclusion on the deductibility of related interest   40 
Conclusion of paper        42 
References         45 















Introduction and overview: 
In the recent Pioneer foods case, on 3 February 2010, the Competition Tribunal 
imposed a penalty on Pioneer foods for its role in a bread cartel and ordered 
Pioneer to desist from such conduct forthwith. The cartel involved the four 
primary bakeries Tiger (Albany), Premier (Blue Ribbon), Foodcorp (Sunbake) 
and Pioneer, which owns Sasko and Duens bakeries. Together the four bakeries 
enjoy a market share of between 50-60% of the domestic bread market in South 
Africa. The penalty is an amount of R195, 718, 614 and Pioneer has 20 business 
days from the date of the ruling to pay this penalty.1 
 
‘The largest penalty to date has been the R250 million fine imposed on Sasol 
Chemical Industries in the consent and settlement agreement of cartel conduct 
in fertiliser related products. The Tribunal imposed a higher fine of R692 
million on Mittal Steel SA in 2007 for excessive pricing, but the Competition 
Appeal Court set aside the decision and remitted the matter to the Tribunal, 
which is yet to issue an amended decision.’2 
 
From 2002 to 2009 (inclusive) the Competition Tribunal imposed 38 penalties 
for contravention of the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998. These cases often 
involved lengthy legal proceedings drawing out for up to two years with vast 
amounts of expenditure spent on legal fees and advice. With the short time 
period in which a penalty has to be settled, companies often seek debt 
financing, resulting interest being incurred.  
 
With penalties of such large figures and a great deal of press around recent 
cases, the enquiring tax mind is sure to ask, ‘But what of the tax consequences?’. 
                                                
1 Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd (2010) Competition Tribunal 
2 ‘Ten years of enforcement by the South Africa competition authorities – Unleashing Rivalry’ 
published by the Competition Commission South Africa and Competition Tribunal South 














This paper will critically evaluate the tax deductibility of these penalties levied 
in terms of the Competition Act No 89 of 1998 and two commonly related 
expenditures. The two expenditures to be examined are the legal fees incurred 
in defending against the penalties and any interest expense incurred on the 
borrowing of funds to finance such penalties. 
In evaluating the above, this paper will refer to the relevant sections of the 
Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 (“Act”), the Competitions Act No. 89 of 1998 
(“Competition Act”), relevant case law and public policy. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: 
Part A evaluates the tax deductibility of the penalties themselves. This 
deductibility is assessed in terms of the general deduction formula, section 11 
(a), and its components. Public policy, the principles that underpin the legal 
system, is also discussed and the extent to which the allowing of a tax 
deduction for penalties may be contrary to such public policy. Then a specific 
prohibition section 23 (o)(ii) is discussed. This section, specifically enacted to 
disallow the deduction of fines and penalties for unlawful actions, is evaluated 
to determine its application to an administrative penalty levied in terms of the 
Competitions Act. 
 
Part B and C seek to examine the deductibility of the two commonly related 
expenditures to penalties levied in terms of the Competition Act, namely the 
legal fees and interest. The Income Tax Act provides specific sections relating to 
the deductibility of these two expenditures and the prohibition section 23(o) is 
not of application. Firstly, in Part B, the legal fees in defending against a 
potential penalty are evaluated. Legal fees are specifically dealt with in section 














When borrowed funds are used to finance the payment of a Competition 
penalty, interest expenditure is incurred. Part C evaluates the deductibility of 
this interest in terms of the specific section 24J along with public policy. Two 
different types of borrowing, general and specific, are discussed and a brief 
















Part A: Are Competition Penalties Deductible? 
1. General deduction formula s11(a) and related case law 
Perhaps the most well known of the sections to the Act is s11 (a). This section 
provides for general deductions for which a specific deduction is not available. 
There is no specific deduction available for fines or penalties and one must 
therefore refer to s11 (a). Although a general deduction, it is not without its own 
qualifying criteria. In order for expenditure to be deductible under this section 
it needs to be: 
 Expenditure and losses actually incurred 
 In the production of income 
 Not of a capital nature 
 Expended for the purposes of trade 
This last requirement is an overriding principle which applies to all section 11 
deductions and is reinforced in s23 (g). Section 23 (g) is a prohibitive section 
which reads as follows: 
‘[No deduction shall in any case be made in respect of] any moneys, 
claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent to 
which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes of 
trade.’ 
This paper will now discuss each of the above criteria with reference to 
applicable case law before moving on to add the public policy debate and 
s23(o). 
 
“Expenditure actually incurred” 
‘Actually incurred’ in this context has been determined in case law not to refer 
to ‘actually paid’, but rather to the existence of an absolute and unconditional 
legal liability to pay. 3 
                                                
3 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 













It is clear that when a penalty has been imposed by the court in terms of the 
Competition Act that there is an absolute and unconditional legal liability to 
pay and as such no further discussion of this requirement will be made for the 
purposes of this paper. 
 
“In the production of income” 
The requirement for the expenditure to be in the production of income requires 
a more critical evaluation. ‘Expenditure per se does not produce income.’4 It is 
actions and activities that produce income and the question which arises is 
whether or not the expenditure incurred is closely enough related to that 
income.5 
This method of determining whether the expenditure is in the production of 
income was established in the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case of 1936.6 The 
facts of this case involved the tramway company obliged to pay compensation 
to the widow of an employee who was killed during the course of his 
employment. Discussing how to determine whether an expense is “in the 
production of income”, the court stated that: 
‘all expenses attached to the performance of a business operation bona 
fide performed for the purpose of earning income are deductible whether 
such expenses are necessary for its performance or attached to it by 
chance or are bona fide incurred for the more efficient performance of 
such operation provided they are so closely connected with it that they 
may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it.’7 
Thus, the test for whether expenditure is in the production of income involves a 
two step inquiry. Firstly, the act to which the expenditure is attached must be 
performed in the production of income. Secondly, the expenditure in question 
                                                
4 T S Emslie et al Income Tax Cases & Materials  3ed (2001) at 329 
5 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1936 CPD 241 
6 supra (note 5) 













must be so closely linked to such act that it can be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing it.8 
In Rendles case, ‘attached to it by chance’ was further clarified to mean that the 
‘risk of the mishap giving rise to the expenditure [must be] inseparable from or 
a necessary incident of the carrying on of the particular business.’9 
But what about penalties as a result of unlawful business practices? 
In the Alexander von Glehn case, a leading case on fines and penalties in the 
United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal considered that, because the fine was 
imposed on the company for breaking the law, the expense could not be 
connected with or arising out of the company’s trade.10 
 In Mann v Nash, the court referred to Alexander von Glehn, and observed that: 
‘[T]he decision in the case was that payment of those penalties was 
nothing to do with the trade or business; it was not an expense for the 
earning of the profits, but it was an expense in the form of an 
inconvenience which supervened later when the profits were made, 
because illegality had been committed in the course of earning them.’11 
These early United Kingdom decisions suggest that a deduction is denied on 
the basis that the required statutory connection or nexus between the 
fine/penalty and trading is absent.12  
In the South African Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway case, Watermeyer AJP 
qualified his statement that: ‘[P]rovided the act is bona fide done for the purpose 
of carrying on the trade which earns the income, the expenditure attendant on it 
is deductible.’ In qualification of the above he stated that, ‘[I]f the act done is 
unlawful or negligent and the attendant expense is occasioned by the 
                                                
8 T S Emslie et al (note 4) at 330 
9 T S Emslie et al (note 4) at 582 on case COT v Rendle 1965 (1) SA 59 (SRAD),  
10 IRC v Alexander von Glehn and Co Ltd (1919) 12 TC 233 
11 (1932) 16 TC 523 at 529 
12 Interpretation Statement 09/01, ‘Fines and penalties – Income Tax deductibility’ at 3 available at 













unlawfulness or, possibly, the negligence of the act, then probably it would not 
be deductible.’13 
There have however also been South African court cases as far back as 1918, 
which raised the argument that expenditure brought about through unlawful 
actions may indeed be deductible. The Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd case is the 
authority for the preposition that expenditure incurred in producing income, 
from immoral, illegal or ultra vires activities, may be deductible.14 In this case 
the court stated that,  
‘If the income itself is taxable it follows I think that if the [expenditure] 
would have been a legitimate deduction, had the business been legal, 
they would equally be a legitimate deduction if the business is illegal. 
The deductions permitted by our statute are not made to depend on any 
question of legality or illegality… Indeed it seems common sense that if 
illegal profits are taxable they must be subject to the same deductions as 
if they were legal.’15 
When considering an income producing transaction, which constitutes 
unlawful behaviour, one must differentiate between the business operation and 
the unlawful behaviour, which is committed coincidentally to the business 
operation. This was stated in ITC 1199 where the court further stated that ‘…the 
nature and character of a fine as a punishment exacted by the State are such that 
it could not properly, naturally or reasonably be regarded as part of the cost of 
performing the business operation.’  16 
The court cited with approval the following passage from the Australian case of 
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd: 
‘The penalty is imposed as a punishment of the offender considered as a 
responsible person owing obedience to the law. Its nature severs it from 
the expenses of trading. It is inflicted on the offender as a personal 
deterrent, and it is not incurred by him in his character of trader.’ 17 
 
                                                
13 (note 5) at 17 
14 : G Goldswain ‘Illegal activities’ Tax Planning (2008) v 22 No 6 at 143 
15 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd (1918) TPD 32 SATC 47 at 49 
16 (1973) 36 SATC 16 (T) at 20-21 













More recently, in a Canadian court case, the court stated that: 
‘[O]ne legitimate test of whether fines should be deductible as a business 
expense is that of avoidability of the offences… The question here is not: 
could the taxpayer have run his business more cheaply? It is: could the 
taxpayer have reasonably been expected to run his business in consistent 
conformity to this kind of law?’18 
In applying this Canadian ruling to the deductibility of Competition penalties 
one is lead to the question of whether or not businesses can be reasonably 
expected to operate in line with the rules of the Competitions Act.   
 
Due to the nature of the actions for which Competition penalties are imposed 
and that the penalties are preventative in nature, it is reasonable to assume that 
in the majority of circumstances, businesses can reasonably be expected to 
operate within these rules. Penalties paid in contravention of the Competitions 
Act are not a necessary cost of doing business in the same way that negligence 
is not. 
 
The trade requirement: 
Prior to its amendment in 1993 the trade requirement, found in s23(g), required 
expenditure to be wholly and exclusively for purposes of trade in order to be 
deductible. Now amended this section provides that expenditure is not 
deductible to the extent that it is not laid out for the purposes of trade and 
therefore allows for apportionment where expenditure is both for a trade and 
non-trade purpose. Although mostly prior to this amendment, case law is still 
useful in determining what does and does not constitutes a trade purpose.  
 
In general expenditure that is laid out for purposes of making a profit is always 
considered to be for purposes of trade. However, 
                                                













‘the absence of a profit does not necessarily exclude a transaction from 
being part of the taxpayer’s trade…Where, however, a trader normally 
carries on by buying goods and selling them at a profit, then as a general 
rule a transaction entered into with the purpose of not making a profit, 
or in fact registering a loss, must, in order to satisfy s 23(g), be shown to 
have been so connected with the pursuit of the taxpayer’s trade, e.g. on 
ground of commercial expediency or indirect facilitation of the trade, as 
to justify the conclusion that, despite the lack of profit motive, the 
moneys paid out under the transaction were wholly and exclusively for 
the purposes of trade’.19 
The paying of penalties does not in itself produce income however the company 
is legally bound to pay the penalty and failure to do so could result in forced 
closure, liquidation, loss of licences and a number of other consequences not 
conducive to a good trading situation.  
As stated in the Warner Lambert case, ‘To qualify as moneys expended in the 
course of trade, an outlay does not itself have to produce a profit.’20 
 
However, in the most recent case to consider the deductibility of fines the judge 
stated,  
‘[It seems] illogical to seek to deduct fines relating to a breach of the law 
as if they were a business expense, because they relate to activities which 
do not confirm to the law and so are not within the permitted scope of 
the business. I consider that a penalty/fine arising from a taxpayer’s 
illegal activities…cannot have a sufficient nexus with the taxpayer’s 
income earning process so as to create deductibility for that cost of the 
fine.’21 
 
Is it of a capital nature?  
Although this is a matter often overlooked when discussing the deductibility of 
such penalties it is worth considering. As mentioned above, the penalties may 
not be in the production of income themselves, but rather are paid in 
preservation of the environment conducive to the production of income. One 
                                                
19 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1986 (1) SA 8 (A), 47 SATC 229 
20 Warner Lambert SA (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, SARS 2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA) at 16 













may argue that this preservation of the income earning structure is therefore of 
a capital nature22, however the Supreme Court of Appeal has ruled this not to 
be so. In the Warner Lambert case it was ruled that expenditure incurred to 
preserve, or avert the risk of harm to, the income earning structure are 
payments of a revenue nature, in the same manner as insurance payments are 
of a revenue nature. 23 This case allows one to draw the distinction between 
payments to create an income earning structure – capital nature, and payments 
made to preserve it – revenue nature. 
If Competition penalties are not paid the business would be foreclosed. Such 
payments are therefore of a revenue nature as they protect the income earning 
structure. 
 
                                                
22 Smith v Secretary for Inland Revenue (1968) 30 SATC 35 at 37 













2. Public Policy 
‘Public policy is based on the premise that the law should serve the public 
interest. It assists judges in the concurrent development of the common law and 
statutory interpretation… 
Public policy is a collection of principles that judges consider the law has a duty 
to uphold. This distinction is important because, although a rule of law binds, a 
principle merely guides. If an Act incorporates a rule, that rule is binding for 
the purposes of the Act. In contrast, as a principle is not binding, it leaves scope 
for more flexible application depending on the circumstances of a particular 
case. However, while there is flexibility in the application of judicial principles, 
it is expected that judges take heed of the principles in relevant cases.’24 
 
In the Australian Mayne Nickless case25, the taxpayer, a transport operator who 
ran armoured cars, had incurred a multitude of fines and penalties related to a 
variety of motoring offences. Ormiston J examined all the relevant authorities 
and concluded that none of the outgoings was deductible for reasons best 
described as public policy reasons. 
 ‘The critical feature of the fines and penalties are that they are imposed 
for purposes of the law in order to punish breaches thereof… This 
deterrent aspect makes it undesirable for a fine to be deductible, whether 
for serious or minor regulatory offences…To allow such deductions is 
seen as frustrating the legislative intent, as the punishment imposed will 
be seen to be, diminished or lightened.’ 26 
The above judgment was cited with approval in the South African Tax Court by 
Melamet J in 1990.27 
Another public policy argument is that allowing a tax deduction for such fines 
and penalties would enable the offender to share such expenses with the very 
public the laws are enacted to protect.  
                                                
24 (note 12) at 11-12 
25 Mayne Nickless Ltd v FCT (1984) 15 ATR 752 
26 supra at 772-773 













To allow deductibility of fines and penalties may also bring about inequities 
amongst taxpayers. In a New Zealand case it was stated that,  
‘[this practice would] prefer business lawbreakers over individuals as the 
business lawbreaker would obtain the benefit of deductibility of the 
amount of the fine or penalty whereas the individual would have to bear 
that particular expense personally. Additionally it would tend to allow, 
and encourage, lawbreaking and in some instances, to even treat it as a 
legitimate business option resulting in deductibility.’ 28 
 
 ‘Public policy is never static: it evolves over time. This evolution is due to the 
constant change in the wide sphere of interest that constitutes the public 
interest. For example, changes in society’s economic needs, social costs, 
customs, and moral aspirations can affect the public interest. Although public 
policy may change in response to signals from any part of society at any time, 
changes usually occur incrementally. This functional aspect separates public 
policy from rules of law.’ 29 
As noted by Ormiston J, 
‘Many aspects of public policy have been and remain controversial 
largely because the courts have attempted to express and apply policies 
which did not derive directly from the common law or statute, but were 
derived from what were said to be accepted social or economic beliefs at 
the time. These beliefs have not always remained constant, so that 
difficulties arise in determining whether ‘public policy’ can change or 
expand.’30 
 
It is noteworthy that section 59(2) of the Competitions Act places a ceiling or 
cap on the maximum penalty that can be imposed. This is set at 10% of the 
offending firm’s turnover during the firm’s preceding financial year. ‘The fact 
that it is set out in this way and not, as in section 74, which provides a set 
maximum penalty for criminal offences, suggests that the legislature intended 
the penalty to be relative to the economic impact of the respondent in the 
market… This relative, as opposed to absolute cap, is more consistent with a 
                                                
28 Nicholas Nathan Ltd v CIR (1989) 11 NZTC 6,213 at 6,217 at 9 
29 (note 12) at 11-12 













deterrent than a punitive model, [as] it requires greater administrative penalties 
to be imposed on larger players.’31  
 
As was well put by van Dorsten, a South African tax practitioner, ‘The deterrent 
effect of the administrative penalty would be ‘diminished or lightened’ if it 
were to be allowed as a tax deduction. This would result in the legislative intent 
behind section 59(1) of the Competition Act being frustrated. It must, 
accordingly, be concluded that it would be contrary to public policy to allow 
expenditure incurred as a result of the imposition of an administrative penalty 
to be deducted in terms of section 11(a) of the Act.’ 
 
Public policy plays an important role in relation to the tax deductibility of fines 
and penalties. From the perspective of serving the public interest, the general 
aim of the public policy approach to fines and penalties is understandable. 
 
Anti-competitive behaviour is often in the production of income. One would 
expect this to be the case as it is indeed the motivation behind such illegal 
actions. Due to this, and that usually most of the other s11(a) requirements can 
be shown to be met, one can conclude that it is often easier for judges to refer to 
public policy in the prohibition of such deductions. 
 
                                                













3. The prohibition section 23(o): 
Section 23(o) was introduced into the Act by section 28(1)(e) of the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act, No. 31 of 2005 with effect from 1 January 2006. It applies 
in respect of any year of assessment commencing on or after that date and reads 
as follows: 
‘23. Deductions not allowed in determination of taxable income. 
―No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following 
matters, namely―  
(a) – (n). . . . . .  
(o) any expenditure incurred―  
(i) where the payment of that expenditure or the agreement or offer to 
make that payment constitutes an activity contemplated in Chapter 2 of 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No.12 
of 2004); or  
(ii) which constitutes a fine charged or penalty imposed as a result of an 
unlawful activity carried out in the Republic or in any other country if 
that activity would be unlawful had it been carried out in the Republic.’  
 
Before the introduction of s23 (o), the Act did not specifically address the non-
deductibility of expenses incurred in respect of illegal activities, and the matter 
had to be considered under the general deduction formula (section 11(a) taking 
into account section 23(g)). As discussed earlier; it is often argued that bribes, 
fines and penalties incurred in the course of carrying on a trade are deductible 
for income tax purposes on the basis that they are an in the production of 
income and incurred in carrying out the taxpayer’s trade. So as not to rely on 
the courts subjective application of public policy s23 (o) was introduced so as to 
put an end to the debate. 
 
The policy reason for inserting section 23(o) was explained as follows in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2005:  
‘From a policy perspective the deduction of fines and penalties for tax 
purposes cannot be justified where those payments relate to unlawful 













reduce the burden of the penalty or fine and be contrary to the rationale 
of the law in terms of which it is imposed.’32 
 
S23(o)(i) relates specifically to corrupt activities and is therefore not relevant to 
the scope of this paper. What must be considered is whether an administrative 
penalty imposed in terms of section 59(1) of the Competition Act is in fact a 
‘penalty imposed as a result of an unlawful activity’, as contemplated in section 
23(o)(ii) of the Act.  
 
Neither ‘penalty’ nor ‘unlawful activity’ is defined in the Act. It is therefore 
prudent to apply the literal interpretation rule as established in the Summit 
Industrial Corporation case.33 This rule requires words to be given their ordinary 
grammatical meaning, unless to do so would cause a nonsensical result or 
would be contrary to the intention of the legislation. 
Black’s Law Dictionary34 defines the above terms as follows: 
‘Penalty’ - ‘a penalty is a sum of money which the law exacts payment of 
by way of punishment for doing some act which is prohibited or for not 
doing some act which is required to be done.’  
 
‘Unlawful’ - ‘That which is contrary to, prohibited, or unauthorised by 
law. That which is not lawful. The acting contrary to, or in defiance of, 
the law; disobeying or disregarding the law.’  
 
In Rex v Laughton, Matthews J stated:  
‘“Penalty”, when used in a statute – though it may not always import a 
punishment for a criminal offence – does at least imply some form of 
sanction declared or operating by order of a court of law.’ 35 
                                                
32 at 24 
33 Summit Industrial Corporation v Claimants against the Fund Comprising the Proceeds of the Sale of 
the MV Jade Transporter (1987) 2 SA 547 (A) at 596 
34 Bryan A. Garner Black's Law Dictionary 8th ed (2004) 













It is clear from the dictionary and judicial definitions of the word ‘penalty’ that 
an administrative penalty falls within the ambit of the ordinary meaning of 
‘penalty’.36 
 
Law has been defined as ‘any law, proclamation, ordinance, Act of Parliament 
or other enactment having the force of law.’37 
 
Whether or not the actions which bring about the penalty are ‘unlawful’ 
requires an examination of s59(1) of the Competition Act, which lists the only 
contraventions for which a penalty may be imposed. As the penalty may only 
be imposed on firms that contravene or disregard specific provisions of the 
Competition Act or orders of the Competition Tribunal or the Competition 
Appeal Court, and this Act is enacted by Parliament and signed by the 
President, there can be no doubt that such conduct is unlawful.38 This was 
confirmed in relation to price-fixing in American Natural Soda Ash Corporation 
case, where Davis JP stated:  
‘The Court also upheld the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that 
section 4(1)(b) of the [Competition] Act rendered unlawful the setting of 
a selling price regardless of whether conduct which fell within the 
section could be justified on efficiency grounds.’ 39 
 
It follows that an administrative penalty constitutes a penalty imposed as a 
result of an unlawful activity’, as contemplated in section 23(o) (ii) of the Act 
and, as such, does not qualify for deduction. 
 
                                                
36 (note 31) at 146 
37 J van Dorsten Revenue words and phrases – Judicially considered. (1989) 
38 (note 31) at 146 
39 American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and Another v Competition Commission of South Africa and 













It is worth noting that in the Draft Interpretation Note on section 23(o)40, SARS 
has indicated, in paragraph 4.2.2, that it regards the practices prohibited by the 
Competition Act as unlawful acts for the purposes of section 23(o)(ii). However, 
interpretation notes are not enacted into law and therefore are not binding. 
 
                                                













4. Conclusion for the deductibility of Competition penalties: 
For many years courts have been faced with having to decide the deductibility 
of fines, penalties and damages incurred as a result of unlawful acts. The two 
approaches adopted have been that of focusing on the ‘production of income’ 
requirement, or relying on public policy. There are arguments both for and 
against the fines and penalties being in the production of income and there is 
case law to support either argument. Public policy however, does not support 
the deductibility of such penalties as it would diminish their punitive nature, 
treat business lawbreakers more favourably than non-business lawbreakers, 
and encourage lawbreaking as a legitimate business option.  
 
As the application of public policy is not an exact science, but rather a more 
subjective approach, s23(o) was enacted to prohibit the deductions of bribes, 
fines and penalties relating to unlawful activities. Using the ‘literal 
interpretation rule’ for the words ‘penalty’ and ‘unlawful’ it appears evident 
that this prohibition section indeed encompasses fines and penalties levied by 
the Competition Act. 
 
Although this paper now concludes that penalties levied by the Competitions 
Act 58 of 1962 are not deductible for tax purposes, an investigation into the 
related expenditures is still required as these are not ‘fines’ or ‘penalties’ and 













Part B: Deductibility of related legal fees 
1.  Introduction 
Legal fees are an important expense to consider and can often amount to more 
than the amounts of the claims, damages or penalties. In a High Court case 
involving a defamation charge, a taxpayer was ordered to pay damages of    
R35, 000 whilst his legal fees amounted to R451, 952.41  
 
Where a case is successfully won against the Competition Commission, costs 
may or may not be awarded. Where costs are not awarded, legal fees will still 
have to be paid despite the court finding in favour of the taxpayer. As such the 
deductibility of the legal fees is as important, if not more so, than the penalties 
themselves.  
 
This paper will now seek to examine the deductibility of these related legal fees 
in both the circumstances where the proceedings were found in favour of the 
taxpayer (i.e. no penalty paid) and where the taxpayer was ordered to pay a 
penalty over to the Competition Commission. 
 
                                                













2. Section 11(c) deduction and related case law 
The deductibility of legal fees is governed by s11(c) of the Act and provides for 
the deductibility of, ‘any legal expenses actually incurred by the taxpayer during 
the year of assessment in respect of any claim, dispute or action at law arising in 
the course of or by reason of the ordinary operations undertaken by him in the 
carrying on of his trade’.42 
 
Legal fees are defined as ‘being fees for the services of legal practitioners, 
expenses incurred in procuring evidence or expert advice, court fees, witness 
fees and expenses, taxing fees, the fees and expenses of sheriffs or messengers 
of court and other expenses of litigation which are of an essentially similar 
nature to any of the said fees or expenses’.43 
A proviso to s11(c) then limits this deduction to so much thereof as-- 
i)          is not of a capital nature; 
ii)         is not incurred in respect of any claim made against the taxpayer 
for the payment of damages or compensation if by reason of the nature 
of the claim or the circumstances any payment which is or might be 
made in satisfaction or settlement of the claim does not or would not rank 
for deduction from his income under paragraph (a); and 
iii)        is not incurred in respect of any claim made by the taxpayer for 
the payment to him of any amount which does not or would not 
constitute income of the taxpayer; and 
iv)        is not incurred in respect of any dispute or action at law relating 
to any such claim as is referred to in paragraph (ii) or (iii) of this proviso 
 
The scope of this section is specific to the legal fees relating to the defence of 
having to pay penalties to the Competition Commission in terms of the 
Competition Act. Subsection (iii) is therefore not relevant as it relates to legal 
fees for proceedings in which the taxpayer seeks the receipt of payment. 
Subsection (iv) shall also not be discussed as it is merely an enforcement of 
subsections (ii) and (iii). 
                                                














From the legislation one can draw the following: In order for legal fees, actually 
incurred in defending against a penalty imposed to be deductible, they need to 
be in the ordinary course of operations undertaken in the carrying on of trade. Such 
legal fees must not be of a capital nature and furthermore must not be prohibited 
by proviso (ii). There is no requirement for the legal fees to be in the production 
of income as with section 11 (a). 
 
The issue of whether or not legal fees are in the ordinary course of operations 
undertaken in the carrying on of trade is not one which has often come up in court. 
Where legal fees have been disallowed as a deduction it is usually on the basis 
that they are not in the production of income or are of a capital nature. 
In the Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways case, legal fees were disallowed a 
deduction on the basis that they were not in the production of income. As this is 
no longer a requirement, since the enactment of section 11 (c), we can conclude 
that these legal fees would now deductible, provided they are not of a capital 
nature. 
 
An example of where legal fees would be of a capital nature is if they were 
incurred in the acquisition of a capital asset. The legal fees would therefore be 
of a capital nature and as such not deductible, but rather added to the base cost 
of the capital asset for future capital gains tax calculation. 
 
As per the discussion in Part A (1), it has been ruled that expenditure for the 
preservation of income is not of a capital nature.44 As discussed, the payment of 
a penalty imposed is in the preservation of the income earning structure of the 
company and hence of a revenue nature. One can infer further that expenditure 
incurred to minimise this revenue expenditure (penalties) is also not of a capital 
nature.  
                                                













The general rule for the deductibility of legal fees in defending a claim is that it 
follows the deductibility of that claim if it were to be paid, this is in general 
terms what the proviso (ii) to s11(c) seeks to achieve. To clarify, if a company 
incurs legal fees in defending against a penalty, and if that penalty were 
incurred it would be deductible, then the legal fees too will be deductible. If the 
penalty would not be deductible then the legal fees would not be deductible. 
Note that as legal fees are not fines or penalties their deduction is not prohibited 
by section 23(o)(ii). 
 
Proviso (ii) to section 11(c) states that for the legal fees to be deductible the 
claim for damages or compensation must rank for deduction under section 11(a). As 
discussed in Part A, Competition penalties may indeed rank for deduction under 
s11 (a), but are then prohibited by s23 (o)(ii). It can certainly be argued that 
although s23 (o) prohibits the deduction of the penalties, they do rank for 
deduction under s11 (a) and as such proviso (ii) is not applicable. It is however 
highly likely that the courts will prohibit the deduction of the legal fees where 
they prohibit the deduction of the penalty if for no other reason than public 
policy. 
 
But what of the scenario mentioned in the introduction, where the defendant 
wins its case and as such no penalties are imposed, yet legal fees are incurred? 
It would seem unjust for such legal fees not to be deductible, merely based on 
the fact that had the defendant been found guilty, such penalties would be 
prohibited from deduction. In a case involving a chemical company which had 
been found not guilty of negligence resulting in mercury poisoning of its 
employees, the related legal fees were found to be deductible. 
‘[The court] held on the evidence that legal fees in issue were incurred to 
defend taxpayer’s stance that it had not been negligent and that it had 
not contravened regulations – [The court] held accordingly that legal 













costs were connected to the taxpayer’s income earning operations and 
consequently not of a capital nature.’45 
 
It can certainly be said that had the chemical company been found guilty of 
negligence and/or contravention of regulations, the penalties imposed would 
most likely not have been deductible. Such a finding would be in line with 
Joffe’s case46, public policy and s23(o). That the legal fees were found to be 
deductible appears to rest on the fact that the chemical company was found not 
guilty and therefore that proviso ii of s11 (c) would be inapplicable. 
 
In the debate at hand it could further be argued that a penalty/fine imposed by 
the Competition Tribunal is not damages or compensation as mentioned in 
proviso (ii) and that as such, the proviso would not apply. 
                                                
45 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Thor Chemicals SA (Pty) Ltd (2000) 62 SATC 
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3. Conclusion for the deductibility of related legal fees 
Legal fees incurred in defending against the Competition Commission can often 
be of great expense due to the lengthy period of time these types of cases can 
take. As such the deductibility of these legal expenses can have a material 
impact on the tax paid by the prosecuted company. 
 
Section 23(o)(ii), which prohibits the deduction of Competition penalties does 
not apply to the related legal fees as they are not a fine charged or penalty 
imposed as a result of an unlawful activity. The relevant section is solely section 
11 (c), a section specific to legal fees. 
 
In the determination of such deductibility, courts have primarily stuck to the 
principle that the deductibility of legal fees follows the deductibility of that 
against which you are defending. Legal fees in defence against the Competition 
Commission can be proven to be actually incurred in the ordinary course of 
operations undertaken in the carrying on of trade and not be of a capital nature. The 
hurdle which appears is the proviso (ii) to section 11 (c) which requires the 
damages or compensation to rank for deduction from income under s11 (a). 
 
Strict interpretation of the proviso (ii) to section 11 (c) would allow one to infer 
that the proviso does not apply to Competition penalties as they are not damages 
or compensation and further that the penalties do rank for deduction under section 
11 (a) despite being subsequently disallowed by section 23 (o). Due to public 
policy however, so as not to reduce the effect of the penalty, courts are unlikely 
to allow the deduction of the legal fees where the penalty itself was disallowed 
as a deduction.  
 
In the situation where no penalty is imposed, proviso (ii) should have no 













also no public policy argument, as the company has been convicted of no 
wrongdoing, and as such there is no penalty that would be lightened if the legal 
fees are allowable as a deduction. 
 
It follows that legal fees are deductible where no penalty is imposed but that 
where a penalty has been imposed for infringement of the Competition Act the 
















Part C: Deductibility of related interest expense 
1. Introduction  
In the recent Pioneer Foods case finalised on 3 February 2010, Pioneer Foods 
(Pty) Ltd was ordered by the Competition Tribunal to pay a penalty of         
R195, 718, 614. The penalty was to be paid to the Commission within 20 
business days of the date of the order.47 
 
With such large sums of money and the short time period in which penalties 
often have to be paid, it is intuitive that companies faced with these penalties 
will need to source financing and in so doing will incur interest expenditure. 
Such borrowing will either be in the form of general borrowing or specific 
borrowing and these two forms can have very different tax results. 
 
This section of the paper will examine the relevant sections of the Act and 
related case law on the deductibility of interest. These principles will then be 
applied to the specific situation where a company raises a loan in order to pay a 
penalty imposed by the Competition Tribunal and whether the interest on the 
loan would be deductible. It will also address how businesses should structure 
their financing so as to be most tax efficient. 
 
                                                













2. Relevant sections of the Act  
The deductibility of interest is governed by section 24J of the Income Tax Act. 
Prior to 1 January 2005 the general deduction formula - s11(a) - was the section 
under which interest was deducted and s24J was merely a timing section and 
did not operate as a charging section which provided for the deduction of 
interest. Section 24J was applied to determine the amount of interest which may 
be deducted in each year of assessment. 
 Section 24J was amended by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No. 32 of 2004 
with effect from 1 January 2005, so that section 24J operated as the charging 
section and a deduction of interest is to be claimed in terms of section 24J(2) 
(and not section 11(a)).48 
Section 24J(2) reads as follows: 
‘(2) Where any person is the issuer in relation to an instrument during 
any year of assessment, such person shall for the purposes of this 
Act be deemed to have incurred an amount of interest during 
such year of assessment, which is equal to –  
(a) the sum of all accrual amounts in relation to all accrual periods 
falling, whether in whole or in part, within such year of 
assessment in respect of such instrument; or 
(b) an amount determined in accordance with an alternative 
method in relation to such year of assessment in respect of 
such instrument, 
which must be deductible from the income of that person derived from 






                                                














For section 24J (2) to apply there must be an “issuer” and an “instrument”. An 
issuer is defined in s24J as: 
‘in relation to any instrument –  
(a) any person who has incurred any interest or has any obligation to repay 
any amount in terms of such instrument…’ 
and an instrument means ‘any form of interest-bearing arrangement, whether 
in writing or not…’ 
“Interest” as defined in s24J, ‘includes the 
(a) gross amount of any interest or related finance charges, discount or 
premium payable or receivable in terms of or in respect of a financial 
arrangement; 
(b) amount (or portion thereof) payable by a borrower to the lender in terms 
of any lending arrangement as represents compensation for any amount 
to which the lender would, but for such lending arrangement,  have been 
entitled; and 
(c) absolute value of the difference between all amounts receivable and 
payable by a person in terms of a sale and leaseback arrangement as 
contemplated in section 23G throughout the full term of such 
arrangement, to which such person is a party…’ 
 
For the purposes of this paper the interest involved has the same definition as 
the common understanding of the word, being expenditure for the use of 
money borrowed.  
 
As is the case in section 11(a), read with section 23(g), section 24J(2) requires 
that the interest expenditure be incurred in the production of income. However, 
there is no requirement in section 24J(2) that the expenditure must not be of a 
capital nature. This is therefore quite different from the legal fees which were 















Even if it was a requirement for interest not to be of a capital nature there is 
authority in an Appellate Division case that interest is of a revenue nature as it 
is paid for the use of money and therefore akin to rental.49 As far back as 1912 it 
was stated in Farmer v Scottish North American Trust Ltd that,  
‘Interest is, in truth, money paid for the use or hire of an instrument of 
their trade, as much as is the rent paid for their office or the hire paid for 
a typewriting machine. It is an outgoing by means of which the company 
procures the use of the thing by which it makes a profit, and, like any 
similar outgoing, should be deducted from the receipts to ascertain the 
taxable profits and gains which the company earns.’50  
It is noteworthy however, that a recent Australian case did actually find 
interest, in a particular set of facts, to be of a capital nature.51 This requires no 
further mention however, since section 24J requires no such classification. 
 
In determining whether or not interest is incurred in the production of income it is 
necessary to consider the purpose with which the interest expense is incurred 
and what it actually affects.52 The purpose with which the interest is incurred 
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3. General vs. specific borrowing 
In CIR v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd53 the following principles were 
established to determine the deductibility of interest on money borrowed: 
(1) In deciding whether expenditure is incurred in the production of income, 
important and often overriding factors are the purpose of the 
expenditure and what the expenditure actually affects; and in this regard 
the closeness of the connection between the expenditure and the income-
earning operations has to be assessed. 
(2)  More specifically, in determining whether interest (or other like 
expenditure) incurred in respect of moneys borrowed is deductible, a 
distinction may in certain circumstances have to be drawn between the 
case where a taxpayer borrows a specific sum of money and applies it to 
an identifiable purpose, and the case where, a taxpayer borrows money 
generally and upon a large scale in order to raise floating capital for use 
in its business. 
(3)  In the former type of case both the purpose of the expenditure (in the 
form of interest) and what it actually affects can readily be determined 
and identified: a clear and close causal connection can be traced. Both 
these factors are, therefore, important considerations in determining the 
deductibility of the expenditure. 
(4)  In the latter type of case, however, there are certain factors which 
prevent the identification of such a causal connection and one cannot say 
that the expenditure was incurred in order to achieve a particular effect. 
All that one can say is that in a general sense the expenditure is incurred 
in order to provide the institution with the capital with which to run its 
business; but it is not possible to link particular expenditure with the 
various ways in which the capital is in turn utilised. The most important 
factor is the purpose of the borrowing. 
                                                












The principle of looking at the purpose for which money was borrowed, to 
determine whether or not the interest expense is incurred in the production of 
income, was established in Producer v COT 54 and clarified in Financier v COT. 55 
The courts held that if money was borrowed for good and sufficient reasons for 
use in the business, it was of no consequence that it was ultimately used for a 
purpose which did not produce taxable income; the interest would still be tax 
deductible. The ultimate use of the money was said to be helpful in determining 
the purpose of borrowing, but is not the decisive factor. It is the purpose for the 
loan that is decisive. 
  
‘From the case law, it seems reasonable that where a company regularly accepts 
loans in the daily running of their business and one of such loans or part thereof 
is then used to extinguish the liability to pay Competition penalties, that the 
interest on such money borrowed would still be deductible because if one looks 
to the purpose of borrowing the money, it was a legitimate business purpose, in 
the production of income.’ 56 The fact that the money is ultimately used for 
something else does not alter this purpose.57  
 
What requires further evaluation is whether the interest on money borrowed 
specifically for the purpose of paying Competition penalties would be 
deductible, where the penalties themselves are not deductible. To answer this 
question it is necessary to evaluate the purpose for which the money was 
borrowed. 
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56 C Emslie ‘The tax deductibility of interest on money borrowed to pay penalties imposed by 
the Competition Tribunal in terms of the Competition Act, 89 of 1998’ Unpublished Paper (2009) 













4.  Purpose of borrowing 
As stated at length in the previous section the decisive factor in determining 
whether or not interest expense is deductible is the purpose of the borrowing. 
The court in the Allied Building Society case agreed with this view stating that, 
‘in determining the purpose of the borrowing, the ultimate user of the money 
may, no doubt, in certain cases be a relevant factor; but the dominant question 
remains: what was the true nature of the transaction?’.58 
 
In order to fully appreciate the importance of this concept of purpose, an 
examination of the Ticktin Timbers case is required. The simplified facts of this 
case were that a close corporation borrowed money in order to pay out a 
dividend. The paying out of a dividend is held not to be in the production of 
income as it is rather a distribution of income after the fact. The court ruled that, 
 ‘the loan was not needed for the taxpayer’s income producing activities, 
and the intention was to increase [the shareholder’s] income, not that of 
the taxpayer. The liability for the interest was accordingly not incurred in 
the production of the taxpayer’s income.’59  
Even more relevant to the facts of this paper is the obiter in the Ticktin Timbers 
case that,  
‘There [is] a clear conceptual distinction between, on the one hand, a case 
in which a company in good faith… paid a dividend, but shortly 
thereafter learned the true financial position of the company and 
realised... that an equivalent sum would have to be borrowed to finance 
the company’s trading activities and, on the other hand a case such as the 
present [where the money is borrowed to finance the dividend]. The fact 
that the payment of the dividend was the historical cause of the company 
needing to borrow [is] irrelevant, the purpose of the borrowing being to 
finance the company’s trading operations after it had parted with its own 
resources while under the misapprehension that it could afford to do 
so.’60 
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The Ticktin case can be distinguished from the situation being examined in this 
paper in that ‘the taxpayer in Ticktin was ‘under no obligation to part with’ the 
money used to make the distribution of dividends. When the Competition 
Tribunal imposes penalties on a taxpayer, the taxpayer is under an obligation to 
part with that money, and the company would have to, in some way, ensure 
that after paying the penalty, it is left with sufficient liquid funds to continue to 
run its business.’ 61 
 
In the case of SARS v BP South Africa (Pty) Ltd62 an amount of interest of           
R81, 755, 944 was held to be deductible. This case also involved the funds being 
utilised in the payment of a dividend [expenditure otherwise than in the 
production of income], but was distinguishable from the Ticktin Timbers case in 
that it had the resources available to pay the dividend and the purpose of the 
borrowing was rather to fund future business operations. 
 
Based on the Ticktin ruling, one may infer that if a company were to borrow 
specifically for a purpose that is not in the production of taxable income [the 
payment of the Competition penalty], then such interest would not be 
deductible. However, if the same company were to exhaust its resources to pay 
the penalty and at a later date obtain financing in order to continue with its 
business operations, such interest may be deductible on the basis that its 
purpose was in the production of income. Further, based on the ruling in the BP 
South Africa case, one can infer that if the company has the necessary resources 
to pay the penalty, yet it knows that at a future date resources will be required 
for business operations, it can obtain a loan with the purpose of the borrowing 
being for business operations in the production of income, and as such, claim 
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the interest as a tax deduction. ‘The historical cause of the company needing to 
borrow is irrelevant.’63 
 
In determining the deductibility of interest expense, one needs to ascertain the 
purpose for which the money was borrowed. Whilst the money is ultimately 
used to pay the Competition penalty, a broader perspective is required to 
determine the true purpose of the borrowing. If one compares the scenario of 
paying the penalty versus infringing the levied penalty, it is clear that the 
second is not a viable action for the continuation of business operations as there 
exists a legal obligation to pay the penalty and non-payment will most likely 
force the company into liquidation. 
 
In comparing the options of borrowing versus not borrowing there are two 
scenarios. If the taxpayer has the necessary resources available and is merely 
borrowing so as to increase its capacity for expansion, the BP case can be used 
to infer a deduction of the interest. If however the taxpayer does not have the 
resources available, then it can be argued that although the borrowing is used 
to pay the penalty, the overriding reason for borrowing was to allow for the 
continuing trade operations of the business in the production of income and for 
that reason, the interest is deductible. 
 
When a company receives financing it does not usually do so without some 
kind of security being offered for the loan and it needs to remain in a solvent 
position, where its assets exceed its liabilities. Let us compare the scenarios of 
two companies, A and B, both levied with R25, 000, 000 in Competition 
penalties. Company A has used a mortgage loan to finance its buildings and 
has cash and cash equivalents (such as stocks and bonds) available with which 
to pay the penalty. Company B financed its buildings using its equity reserves 
                                                













and therefore requires a loan in order to pay the penalty. The bank requires 
security for the loan, and to obtain the lowest interest rate Company B obtains a 
mortgage loan over its buildings. 
It is easily deduced that after the payment of the penalty company A and B will 
be in the same financial situation with their buildings now offered as security 
for debt. Company A’s interest expense on its mortgage would definitely be tax 
deductible as the loan was taken out in the ordinary course of business 
operations. It seems an injustice for Company B not to get the tax deduction 
merely because it did not seek debt financing prior to the imposition of the 
penalty. Company B is in essence reshuffling its financing arrangements.  
 
In CIR v DG Smith the court found in favour of such reshuffling of finances to 
gain a tax advantage. The facts of this case involved the taxpayer having 
originally used his own resources (equity financed) to pay for income 
producing capital and then at a later period withdrawing this capital and 
replacing it with money sourced through a loan (debt financed). The court 
accepted this and allowed the subsequent interest as deductible, stating: 
‘that the fact that the [taxpayers] had, in the past, funded the business 
from their own resources did not oblige them to continue to do so in the 
future; there was no obligation on the [taxpayers] to finance the business 
from their own resources and if they chose to do so by obtaining funds 
from a source which would charge interest, that interest was, prima facie 
at least, expenditure incurred in the production of income.’64 
Whilst this reshuffling arrangement is most certainly to gain a tax advantage, 
the court further stated: 
‘[T]here was no doubt that the essential, if not the sole, motive of the 
taxpayer was to gain a tax advantage but the taxpayer’s motive must not 
be elevated beyond its true relevance because the test is not limited to or 
dominated by a taxpayer’s motive; despite the fact that his motive may 
be to gain some tax advantage, a taxpayer’s intention may nevertheless 
be to earn income and the real question was whether it was in the 
production of income that the expenditure was laid out.’ 
                                                













Based upon the findings of this case, one can certainly conclude that a company 
which reshuffles its financing arrangements (such that income producing assets 
that were previously equity financed are now debt financed) in order to have 
the resources available to pay a Competition penalty, may indeed claim the 

















5. Public policy    
It is argued that since the actions resulting in a Competition penalty are 
unlawful, the related interest is linked to this unlawful action and therefore a 
deduction should be prohibited. As section 23(o) does not apply to such interest 
expenditure, this argument stems purely from a public policy perspective. The 
purpose and nature of public policy has been thoroughly discussed in Part A (2) 
of this paper. What remains to be addressed is how public policy relates 
specifically to the deduction of interest on borrowed money utilised in the 
paying of Competition penalties. 
 
In considering these public policy aspects, it is necessary to consider whether or 
not the interest expenditure is sufficiently removed from the original unlawful 
act, so as to be examined separately from the penalty itself for deduction. ‘One 
could argue that without the unlawful conduct of the taxpayer, the penalty 
would not have been imposed and the obligation to pay which led to the 
borrowing of money and the consequent interest expenditure would not have 
arisen...’65  
While this may indeed be the case, it is not the unlawful activity which has 
brought about the interest expense, but rather the decision to used borrowed 
money to settle the penalty. Even companies without finances available have 
the option to sell off income generating assets in order to pay the penalty. The 
reason such a decision is usually not made is due to the company wanting to 
continue to trade and generate a profit. So whilst the penalty itself is due to the 
unlawful activity, the interest expense is due to a subsequent business decision 
to borrow in order to continue to trade and generate income. This decision is 
neither unlawful nor tainted. 
 
                                                













Although interest can often amount to a large figure, allowing for its 
deductibility would not reduce the penalty imposed, but merely reduce the cost 
of borrowing. Allowing such interest as a deduction is unlikely to reduce the 
deterrent effect of the penalty, but rather serve as an incentive to borrow, rather 
than cutting back on operations, or expansion projects as a result of the penalty.  
 
Apart from the deterrent effect, public policy also aims for justice and equality. 
One can therefore infer that it would be contrary to public policy to bring about 














6. Conclusion on the deductibility of related interest 
Interest is the cost paid for the borrowing of money, just as rental is paid for the 
use of a thing. The deduction of interest is governed by s24J which requires the 
interest to be in the production of income and there is no requirement for it to be 
not of a capital nature. Even if there were this requirement however, there is 
case law to show it may indeed meet the revenue nature requirement.66  
 
In determining whether or not interest is incurred in the production of income it is 
necessary to consider the purpose with which the interest expense is incurred 
and what it actually affects.67 In determining this purpose it is necessary to 
distinguish between two types of borrowing; general borrowing of a pool of 
money for use as needed in the business and specific borrowing where money 
is borrowed for an identified purpose. With general borrowing there are certain 
factors which prevent the identification of a causal connection between the 
interest expense and a particular effect. All that one can say is that in a general 
sense the expenditure is incurred in order to provide the business with the 
capital with which to run its income producing operations.68 From the case law, 
one can infer that where a company regularly accepts loans in the daily running 
of its business and part of such borrowings is then used to pay Competition 
penalties, that the interest on such loans would still be deductible as the 
purpose of the overall borrowing is undisputedly in the production of income.69 
 
With regard to specific borrowing, the purpose of the borrowing can be more 
readily determined. However; one can deduce that the purpose of the 
borrowing is not to pay a Competition penalty. Whether or not the company 
chooses to finance this obligation using debt or not, the penalty will still have to 
be paid. It is the decision to pay the penalty with debt that brings about such 
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interest and not the penalty itself.  The purpose of the borrowing is to leave 
available for income producing operations the assets and floating capital 
necessary. While it is by no means certain, there is enough case law to support 
the finding of this paper that such borrowing is therefore in the production of 
income and hence the interest is deductible under s24J. 
 
A wise taxpayer would, however, when faced with the payment of such 
Competition penalties, use its available cash and reserves and subsequently 
borrow where such funding is required for income producing operations. This 
structure would rely on the principles established in the Ticktin and BP South 
Africa cases. Alternatively a reshuffling of financing arrangements could be 
arranged so as to debt finance a previously equity financed asset in order to free 
up capital for use in the business, which could then be used to pay the penalty. 
This method of gaining an interest deduction would rely on the principles of 

















Conclusion of paper:   
One’s first instinct may be to decide that penalties for unlawful actions and all 
related expenditure should be disallowed as a tax deduction. However, the 
expenditure needs to be evaluated in terms of the legislation and each criterion 
individually addressed. In doing this and looking more closely at the purpose 
of the expenditure, the decision turns out not to be quite so straightforward. 
 
For many years, courts have been faced with having to decide the deductibility 
of fines, penalties and damages incurred as a result of unlawful acts. The two 
approaches adopted have been that of focusing on the ‘production of income’ 
requirement, or relying on public policy. It is important to remember that the 
penalty is linked to the unlawful action that created it. This action whilst in the 
production of unlawful income is none the less in the production of taxable 
income. When producing unlawful income the risk of a penalty being imposed 
is an inevitable concomitant of the unlawful actions. The penalty could 
therefore in this regard be argued as in the production of ‘unlawful’ yet taxable, 
income  
 
There are many arguments both for and against the fines and penalties being in 
the production of income and there is case law to support either argument. 
Public policy however, does not support the deductibility of such penalties as it 
would diminish their punitive nature and appear to justify the penalty as a 
legitimate business expense. As the application of public policy is not an exact 
science, but rather a more subjective approach, section 23(o) was enacted to 
prohibit the deductions of bribes, fines and penalties relating to unlawful 
activities. Administrative Competition penalties are indeed found in this paper 
to relate to unlawful activities, as they relate to activities in contravention of the 














Due to the lengthy proceedings in these types of cases, legal fees are an 
important expense to consider, often amounting to very large sums. Section 
23(o)(ii), which prohibits the deduction of Competition penalties does not apply 
to the related legal fees, as they are not a fine charged or penalty imposed. The 
relevant section is section 11 (c), a section specific to legal fees. In determining 
such deductibility, courts have primarily decided that the deductibility of legal 
fees follows the deductibility of that against which one is defending. It is the 
finding of this paper that legal fees meet all the general criteria of section 11(c). 
Proviso (ii) to section 11 (c) which requires the damages or compensation to rank 
for deduction from income under s11 (a) is found not to be of application to 
Competition penalties due to the fact that they are not damages or compensation 
and further that the penalties do rank for deduction under section 11 (a) despite 
being subsequently disallowed by section 23 (o). Due to public policy however, 
it is reasonable that legal fees are not deductible where the court levied a 
penalty which itself is not tax deductible. However, where a company wins its 
case against the Competition Commission and no penalty is levied, this paper 
finds that such legal fees should be deductible. 
 
With such large sums of money and the short time period in which penalties 
often have to be paid, it is intuitive that companies faced with these penalties 
will need to source financing and in doing so will incur interest expenditure. 
Interest is the cost paid for the borrowing of money, just as rental is paid for the 
use of a thing and as such it is of a revenue nature. Borrowing is either in the 
form of general borrowing or specific borrowing and these two forms can have 
very different tax results. 
 
In determining whether or not interest is incurred in the production of income it is 
necessary to consider the purpose with which the interest expense is incurred. 
For general borrowing, one can infer from the case law that where a company 













Competition penalties, that the interest on such loans would still be deductible 
as the purpose of the overall borrowing is undisputedly in the production of 
income. 
 
For specific borrowings, this paper concludes that the purpose of the borrowing is 
not in fact to pay the Competition penalty. Regardless of how the company 
decides to finance it, the penalty will still have to be paid. It is the decision to pay 
the penalty with debt that brings about such interest and not the penalty itself.  
The purpose of the borrowing is to leave available for income producing 
operations the assets and floating capital necessary. As discussed in this paper, 
there is certainly enough case law to support the finding that such borrowing is 
in the production of income and hence the interest is deductible. 
An astute taxpayer should, however, before the final penalty is levied, 
mortgage properties and acquire general loans so that when faced with the 
payment of such Competition penalties, there are available cash reserves.   
 
Whilst the answers are by no means definite, this paper has come to the 
conclusion that penalties levied in terms of the Competitions Act 89 of 1998 are 
not deductible, due to s23 (o)(ii) and public policy considerations. As far as the 
related expenditure is concerned, section 23 (o) does not apply. The 
deductibility of the related legal fees is determined to be deductible where the 
defendant is found not to have to pay a penalty and perhaps not deductible 
where a penalty is levied, again due to public policy considerations. It is the 
finding of this paper, however, due to the reasons stated above, that where 
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